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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction: Moral Victories – The Ethics of Winning Wars 
 
Cian O’Driscoll and Andrew R. Hom 
 
 
Introduction 
There is a poem called ‘Smile Smile Smile’ by Wilfred Owen that captures in a most 
poignant way many of the key themes that this book addresses.  The poem, set in World War 
One, depicts a number of scrappy, wounded soldiers huddling over a copy of the previous 
day’s newspaper that had belatedly made its way to the front.  The headlines puff up Britain’s 
most recent victories, while glossing over the losses that were incurred in their achievement.   
  
Head to limp head, the sunk-eyed wounded scanned 
Yesterday’s Mail; the casualties (typed small) 
And (large) Vast Booty from our Latest Haul (Owen, 2015: 17). 
 
The soldiers also read of the houses that will be built for them when the war is won, and of 
the aerodromes that must be built in the meantime; the promise of an easy life allayed until 
the fighting is through.  There is further cold comfort for the soldiers in the newspaper’s 
declaration that the fighting will not be over any time soon.  The sacrifices of their fallen 
comrades had to be vindicated, they read, and so the war would continue until victory was 
well and truly theirs:   
 
Peace would do wrong to our undying dead,  
The sons we offered might regret they died 
If we got nothing lasting in their stead. 
We must all be solidly indemnified. 
Though all be worthy Victory which all bought. 
 
As with the best of Owen’s poetry, biting irony prefigures the questions he would have his 
reader contemplate.  What is victory in war?  What is it truly worth to us?  If one is fighting 
for a just cause, would it be a dereliction of duty to settle for anything less that victory?  Can 
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victory ever be worthy of the sacrifices rendered by young men and women in its pursuit?  
What is its relation to the peace that everyone hopes will come once the smoke has cleared on 
the battlefield?  This book tackles these questions. 
 
Victory Abounds 
General Douglas MacArthur (1951) proclaimed that the very object of war is victory: ‘In war 
there is no substitute for victory.’  MacArthur was not the first to issue such a claim.  The 
notion that war is, for better or worse, all about victory has a long and storied history.  In the 
classical world, Aristotle (1996: 3) defined victory as the telos of military science, meaning 
that it is the animating purpose of all military activities.  Cicero (1998: 83) endorsed a similar 
claim.  Beyond the western world, Sun Tzu described victory as ‘the main object in war’ 
(quoted in McNeilly, 2015: 16).  In more modern times, Napoleon founded the French 
military academy at Saint-Cyr in the early nineteenth century to train the nation’s soldiers 
how to be victorious.  Victory, it seems, is central to how war is understood and approached.  
Winning, to extend a popular sporting cliché, is not just the most important thing; it is the 
only thing. 
   
Nor is this perspective confined to the distant past.  In May 1940 Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill put the case for the necessity of British involvement in World War Two in terms of 
victory: ‘You ask, what is our aim?  I can answer in one word: victory—victory, victory at all 
costs, victory however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no 
survival’ (quoted in Bond, 1996: 142).  In the 1980’s, the so-called Powell–Weinberger 
doctrine (now more commonly known as the Powell doctrine) re-cast US military doctrine in 
terms of the strategic imperative of victory: ‘When we commit our troops to combat we must 
do so with the sole object of winning.  Once it is clear that our troops are required, because 
our vital interests are at stake, then we must have the firm national resolve to commit every 
ounce of strength necessary to win the fight’ (Weinberger, 1984). 
 
Toward the current era, President George W. Bush (2003) famously announced ‘Mission 
accomplished’ in the Iraq War in May 2003; a formulation reprised by Prime Minister David 
Cameron in Afghanistan in late 2013 (Mason, 2013).  More recently, the December 2015 
parliamentary debate in the United Kingdom (UK) on the decision to intervene against the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Syrian territory turned on the issue of victory.  
Proponents of military action, including Cameron’s government, argued that the nature of the 
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threat from ISIS was such that it simply had to be defeated; failure to procure victory against 
ISIS would, the Prime Minister submitted, be catastrophic for international peace and 
security.  Challenging this view, Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the opposition, claimed that in 
the absence of a clear conception of how victory over ISIS would be achieved, or even what 
it would comprise, it would be irresponsible to loose the dogs of war. And most recently of 
all, Donald Trump rode a discourse of victory all the way to the American Presidency, 
promising often and loudly, ‘we’re going to win at every level … we’re going to win so 
much, you may even get tired of winning.’ Undeterred by the exhaustion of success, Trump 
further declared, ‘we have to keep winning, we have to win more, we’re going to win more!’1  
   
The point to glean from this is the sheer ubiquity of victory talk.  It redounds throughout 
human history, from antiquity to the age Trump.  Yet its prevalence masks a problem.  
Despite its common usage, the issue arises that it can be difficult to discern exactly what 
victory might mean or entail in a concrete situation.  As Michael Walzer (2015: 110) has 
observed, even if it is ‘urgent to win, it is not always clear what winning is.’  None less than 
General Tommy Franks (2006: 8) echoed this view when he emphasized the importance of 
asking what we actually mean when we refer to victory in war: ‘What constitutes victory?  I 
think that is a fundamental question, and it is good for each of us . . . to ask ourselves that 
from time to time.  When we try to decide whether or not we’ve been victorious, we have to 
think, for just a second, what the term “victory” means.’ 
 
Trophies and Triumphs 
What does victory mean, then?  And how would we know it if we saw it?  The ancient 
Greeks had an answer to these questions.  Their ideal of warfare involved two armies, 
comprising massed ranks of heavy infantry (or phalanxes), clashing in pitched battle on a 
level field.  Much grappling, hacking, and slashing would ensue until one army succeeded in 
breaking through its enemy’s ranks and driving it from the field of battle.  Putting the enemy 
to flight gave the dominant side command of the battlefield.  It would then confirm this 
victory by returning to the point where enemy forces had first turned tail and fled (which was 
known as the trope, or turning point) and constructing there a rudimentary battlefield trophy 
(or tropaion).  The erection of the trophy formally concluded the battle by affirming the 
victory of one side and the defeat of the other.  The simple fact that the victor had sufficient 
																																																						
1 See Hom and O’Driscoll (2017). 
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command of the battlefield to erect a trophy unopposed was proof of its success.  By the 
same token, the vanquished army’s demonstrable inability to prevent the trophy’s 
construction confirmed its defeat.  The trophy, then, functioned as a marker that both 
signalled the conclusion of a battle and locked in its result (van Wees, 2004: 136-38). 
 
The Romans went one better by marking victories with a triumph procession.  This was an 
occasion of great pageantry.  The honoured general, or triumphator, was invited by the 
Senate to stage a dramatic, ritualised return to Rome (Beard, 2007: 81–82).  The victorious 
commander, having been granted permission by the Senate to celebrate a triumph, would 
enter Rome via a ceremonial gate, the Porta Triumphalis, and lead his troops along a 
symbolic route through the streets of the city to the Capitol, where he would lay a spray of 
laurel in the lap of the statue of Jupiter.  Preceded by a chain gang of shackled enemy 
captives, and accompanied by trumpeters, flag-bearers, wagons freighted with booty, and 
treasure-chests overflowing with seized bullion, the commander rode in a ceremonial chariot.  
Garbed in a purple tunic embroidered with stars, and with his face dyed red, he carried a 
sceptre.  Flanking him in the chariot, a slave was commissioned to hold a golden crown 
above his head and whisper softly in his ear a warning that all glory is fleeting: ‘Remember 
you are just a man.’  The lavish pageant would culminate with the execution of the least 
fortunate captives and the dispatch of the rest to slavery, the performance of sacrifices, and a 
rowdy street-party that would go long into the night.  As well as permitting Rome an 
opportunity to rejoice in the glory of its imperial expansion, the triumph also came over time 
to be regarded as a marker or final proof of victory.  It is for this reason that Cicero (2006: 
55) referred to the triumphs celebrated by Publius Servilius as ‘the gratifying spectacle of 
captured enemies in chains.’  These events were both popular and necessary, he explained, 
‘because there is nothing sweeter than victory, and there is no more definite proof of victory 
than seeing the people you have many times been afraid of being led in chains to their 
execution’ (Cicero, 2006: 55, emphasis added). 
 
What is notable about the Greek and Roman cases is that the practice of warfare was centred 
on a delimited battle and subject to a widely accepted means of determining who the winner 
was.  Some scholars contend that these conditions endured more or less intact until the 
eighteenth or possibly even nineteenth century (Whitman, 2012).  The problem with modern 
warfare is that it does not conform to these strictures, but is instead a rather more amorphous 
proposition.  Ever since success in battle ceased to function as the prime determinant and/or 
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marker of victory in war, it has become harder to ascertain not only who the winners and 
losers are in any given conflict, but even whether the conflict in question is over.  Phil Klay 
(2014: 77) captures the results of this in an excellent collection of short stories on the Iraq 
War, Redeployment: ‘Success was a matter of perspective.  In Iraq it had to be.  There was no 
Omaha Beach, no Vicksburg Campaign, not even an Alamo to signal a clear defeat.  The 
closest we’d come were those toppled Saddam statues, but that was years ago.’2     
 
Degrade and Destroy 
The difficulties posed by defining victory and identifying it in practice come into sharp focus 
when we consider the so-called ‘War on Terror’; a war that lacks not only a conventional 
enemy, but also a conventional battlefield.  What can victory mean in such a contest?  Does it 
mean the root and branch eradication of Al Qaeda, or even the elimination of terrorism tout 
court?  And how would one gauge progress toward these ends?  As the Secretary of Defense, 
Donald Rumsfeld, complained in 2003, ‘We lack a metrics to know if we are winning or 
losing the Global War on Terror’ (quoted in Mandel, 2006: 135).3  Four years later, General 
David Petraeus echoed Rumsfeld’s consternation.  It is hard to know if you are winning the 
fight against Al Qaeda, he remarked, because ‘this is not the sort of struggle where you take a 
hill, plant the flag, and go home with a victory parade’ (Tran, 2008).  Writing in 2010, 
Andrew Bacevich (2010: 10) noted that policymakers still ‘do not have the foggiest notion of 
what victory would look like, how it would be won, and what it might cost.’  President 
Barack Obama signalled his awareness of these and related issues when he initiated a shift in 
the ‘War on Terror’ discourse away from ‘victory’ and toward less freighted terms, such as 
‘success and ‘progress’ (Martel, 2007: 17).4  As Obama explained, it was natural to feel some 
anxiety ‘about using the word “victory”, because, you know, it invokes this notion of 
Emperor Hirohito coming down and signing a surrender to MacArthur’ (quoted in Blum, 
2013: 421).  While this may be a powerful image, it is neither true to life in the twenty-first 
century, nor an especially helpful artifice. 
   
																																																						
2	This is redolent of President George H. W. Bush’s response to Allied victory in the 1991 Gulf War.  On the 
night of victory, he wrote in his diary: ‘Still no feeling of euphoria.  I think I know why it is.  . . . It hasn’t been 
a clean end—there is no battleship Missouri surrender’ (quoted in Rose, 2010: 226).	
3	For more discussion on this, see (Record, 2003: 5–6).	
4	The word ‘victory’ did not appear once in Obama’s December 2009 West Point speech on the war in 
Afghanistan.	
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The war against ISIS underscores these issues.  As noted above, the main plank of the 
argument employed by opponents of UK military involvement against ISIS in Syria was that 
it would be lunacy to initiate hostilities without a clear conception of the kind of victory 
sought and how it would be accomplished.5  Their concerns were not allayed by the vague 
and expansive (if pleasingly alliterative) war aims stated by the US and its allies: to ‘degrade 
and destroy’ ISIS.  Critics carped that these objectives, designed for media consumption and 
not for the task at hand, were calibrated to neither the facts on the ground nor the West’s 
reliance on air power.  Such a strategy, it was warned, would not vanquish ISIS, but would 
instead merely prompt it to switch its attention from domestic operations to terroristic 
enterprises abroad (Hom, 2016; McIntosh, 2014; 2016). 
 
This is not to gainsay the success that the anti-ISIS coalition has enjoyed; it has been 
significant, especially in the latter half of 2016.  Rather, it is to highlight the difficulties that 
arise when talking about contemporary armed conflict in terms of winning.  As Robert 
Mandel (2007: 18) notes, it is increasingly utopian to believe that wars end with a ‘clean, 
decisive victory for one side or the other.’  Contemporary conflicts more often degenerate 
into quagmire.  Armies that have ostensibly been defeated melt away only to later re-emerge 
and carry on the fight by irregular means.   
 
Mandel’s emphasis on endings alerts us to the temporal issues permeating victory discourse.  
Victory is typically evoked to mark the close of what we commonly call ‘wartime’, a period 
of existential crisis during which exceptional powers and policies take hold and are justified 
by the idea that they are temporary (Dudziak 2012).  As such, it not only demarcates the 
threshold between ‘war’ and ‘peace’, it also suggests the possibility of a decisive end to a 
discrete period of violence, and the promise of a better future.  Such temporal visions do not 
comport with contemporary conflicts, which seldom conclude in any clear-cut fashion and 
instead threaten to segue into a form of ‘forever war’ (Filkins, 2008).  Viewed from such a 
temporal perspective, it is tempting to conclude that nobody wins wars anymore; at most, one 
side loses more slowly than the other.6 
 
																																																						
5	This is redolent of the writings of Carl von Clausewitz: ‘No one starts a war—or rather, no one in his sense 
ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends 
to conduct it’ (Clausewitz, 1976: 579).  For more on Clausewitz, see Chapter two of this volume.	
6	This is a paraphrase from a scene in the HBO television series, The Wire.  It also calls to mind Kenneth 
Waltz’s observation that in modern war ‘there is no victory, only varying degrees of defeat’ (Waltz, 2001: 1).	
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Moral Victories 
Irrespective of the problems that arise when one discusses modern war in the idiom of 
victory, it is nigh impossible to speak about it otherwise.  Efforts to jettison the term ‘victory’ 
and substitute notions like ‘success’ in its place may be attractive at first glance.  But upon 
further inspection they reveal themselves to be merely window-dressing: a re-coding of the 
problem rather than its resolution.  Moreover, such efforts distract from the fundamental 
point that, no matter how vexatious it may be, the concept of victory is hardwired into how 
we think and talk about and practice warfare.  It therefore behoves us not to shy away from 
analysing victory, but instead to embrace the opportunity it presents.  This will involve 
asking how one can discern a just from an unjust victory, and how best to balance the 
obligation to wage wars justly against the imperative to win them.  This returns us to the 
questions that Owen’s poem, which opened this discussion, introduces for consideration.  To 
the degree that one is fighting for a just cause, would it be a dereliction of duty to settle for 
anything less that victory?  Can victory ever be worthy of the sacrifices rendered by young 
men and women in its pursuit?  And what is its relation to the peace that everyone hopes will 
emerge once the guns have fallen silent? 
   
How should one set about answering these questions?  The literature on victory, which is 
largely the preserve of military historians and strategists, is not much help here.  Although 
there is an expansive body of scholarship on victory, it does not engage in a sustained or 
substantive way with ethical issues.7  Instead it pursues four principal avenues of inquiry.  
The first comprises efforts to devise typologies of victory that would enable military planners 
to delineate tactical victories from operational and strategic victories (Martel, 2007).  The 
second traces the evolution of victory as a concept and the impact of successive revolutions 
in military affairs upon it (Bond, 1996; Hobbs, 1979).  The third addresses the issue of how 
victory should be understood in respect of the particularities of contemporary armed conflict 
(Angstrom and Duyesteyn, 2007).  The fourth sets out a case for why, despite its tarnished 
reputation, victory is still a vital concept through which to understand warfare today (Gray, 
1979; Luttwak, 1982).   These discussions either marginalize or ignore ethical concerns. 
  
																																																						
7	The chief exception is Mandel (2006).  Martel (2007) also incorporates a normative dimension into his 
analysis, but it is not his focus.    
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The normative literature on war may be of greater assistance.  This includes those strands of 
political realism that take its ethical implications seriously (Hom, forthcoming).  It also 
includes certain forms of pacifism.  The challenge set forth by Erasmus of Rotterdam is most 
instructive in this regard: ‘Let him apply just a little reason to the problem by counting up the 
true cost of the war and deciding whether the object he seeks to achieve by it is worth that 
much, even if he were certain of victory, which does not always favour even the best of 
causes’ (quoted in Reichberg et al., 2006: 235).  Yet it is arguably just war thinking that 
furnishes us with the most resources for making sense of the ethical questions that victory in 
war raises.  This is true regardless of whether one prefers to treat just war thinking as a 
protean historical tradition or as a contemporary application of moral philosophical reasoning 
(O’Driscoll, 2013).  In either case it supplies a conceptual vocabulary that is tailored to 
teasing out the moral dilemmas that wars (and indeed the challenge of winning them) 
precipitate.  And yet, as we shall see, just war thinkers have generally been reticent to engage 
the idea of victory.  This belies some deep tensions between the just war ethos, which 
emphasises temperance and humility, and the baggage that victory brings with it: 
adversarialism, triumphalism, and vainglory.  There is much to be explored here, and much 
fertile soil to plough.  
 
Traditions and Challenges  
This book is an attempt to set about this task.  It derives from a workshop hosted in Glasgow 
in the summer of 2015.  Its aim was to bring together scholars from different disciplines—
International Relations, Strategic Studies, Religious Ethics, History, and Philosophy—to 
consider how we might better understand the concept of victory and in particular its ethical 
elements.  This conference resulted in a series of further conversations and invitations and, 
ultimately, the collection of essays gathered here, which is divided into two main parts.  The 
first examines the intellectual resources and traditions that may help us better understand and 
engage the concept of victory.  In particular, it focuses on teasing out what one might call the 
ethical component of victory.  How, in other words, should we understand victory today, and 
what might it mean to think of victory as an ethical category?  The second extends those 
resources and traditions to treat a series of contemporary challenges relating to victory.  The 
remit here is to examine how and to what degree the concept of victory is applicable to, and 
helps us gain critical purchase on, the ethical issues that arise in the context of the 
contemporary security environment. 
 
	 9	
Part One, Traditions, explores the principal sources of western thinking about victory.  
Chapter two by John Kelsay kicks proceedings off with an analysis of how victory is posited 
in religious sources.  Focusing on the Jewish and Christian traditions in particular, he 
contends that the different conceptions of victory presented in the Bible form the seedbed for 
later notions of victory in western discourses of war and peace.  Chapter three by Sibylle 
Scheipers extends the conversation to the foundations of modern strategic thought, with a 
discussion of Carl von Clausewitz’s writings on war.  Contrary to the standard view that 
Clausewitz articulated a purely instrumental conception of victory in war, Scheipers reveals 
that he also understood winning in moral terms.  Chapter four by Beatrice Heuser looks at the 
role that commemorative practices play in how historical societies have thought about 
victory. It presents a probing analysis of ‘moral victories’, that is, military defeats that have 
been recast in the popular or national imagination as a source of pride and unity.  Her study, 
which takes in a number of historical and contemporary cases, notes the potential for such 
‘moral victories’ to thwart peace-making and fuel further hostilities.  Chapter five by James 
Turner Johnson turns to the treatment of victory in the just war tradition.  Drawing on the 
works of, among others, Thomas Aquinas and Hugo Grotius, it examines the proposition that 
certain causes are sufficiently important to justify a win-at-all-costs disposition.  Chapter six 
by Chris Brown wraps up Part One by carrying the focus on just war thinking through to the 
present day and examining how victory has changed in light of the recent revisionist turn in 
just war theory.  He offers a stark warning that efforts to replace the Law of Armed Conflict 
with International Human Rights Law are misguided and to be resisted.  
  
Part Two, Challenges, examines the continuing relevance of the ways of thinking about 
victory set out in Part One to contemporary international relations.  Can these ways of 
thinking about victory illuminate the challenges international society confronts today, and 
how should they be revised in light of these challenges?  Chapter seven by Eric Patterson sets 
the ball rolling with a conceptual analysis of victory itself. He connects victory to the values 
of order, justice, and conciliation, and offers a stout defence of its continued utility as an 
ethical category. Chapter eight by Dominic Tierney responds with a discussion of whether 
the concept of victory is applicable when wars are increasingly unwinnable.  How, it asks, in 
an era in which decisive victory is no longer a plausible objective, should we think about the 
ethics and ends of warfare?  Chapter nine by Luke Campbell and Brent Steele develop this 
discussion by scrutinizing the notion of ‘finality’ that is part and parcel of how scholars and 
military practitioners think and talk about victory.  By shifting the register from conclusive 
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ends to contingent and ‘affective’ processes, Campbell and Steele suggest a different way of 
conceptualizing victory, one that takes openness rather than decisiveness as its locus.  
 
Chapters ten through thirteen interrogate these themes in light of the different forms 
contemporary warfare takes.  In chapter ten Kurt Mills deliberates upon what victory can 
mean in the context of humanitarian interventions and actions taken under the umbrella of the 
Responsibility to Protect.  He looks beyond the kinetics of conflict itself and toward post-
conflict justice mechanisms for answers to this question.  Chapter eleven by David Whetham 
treats the role of victory in civil–military relations.  Drawing on a case study from the United 
Kingdom, he explores how affected populations respond to the loss of blood and treasure in 
wars where no victory is in sight.  Chapter twelve by Amy Eckert extends the discussion of 
victory to the realm of private warfare.  She asks how private military companies (PMCs) 
fulfil and impact the related tasks of winning wars and making peace.  In Chapter thirteen, 
Daniel Brunstetter ponders how victory should be understood in respect of the use of military 
force short of war.  This leads to a broader discussion of the limits of just war reasoning and 
the need for a jus ad vim framework that can provide resources for the ethical analysis of 
small-scale military operations such as the use of drone strikes and commando raids.  In the 
volume’s conclusion, we will recapitulate and tease out several key themes from these 
chapters, reflect on how victory changes our understanding of the ethics of war, and provide 
some suggestions for future research.    
 
Conclusion 
The essays that comprise this book turn on one profoundly simple yet agonisingly difficult 
question: War, what is it good for?  As one would expect, the contributors to this volume do 
not all agree with one another about what the correct answers to this question is, or even 
about what might be the right way to tackle it.  They do all speak in unison, however, about 
the importance of grappling with it.  Moreover, the essays presented here converge on the 
point of view that this question cannot be usefully addressed from a purely ethical, political, 
or strategic perspective.  Rather, they argue, it must be engaged in a composite manner that 
brings together all three modes of reasoning.  Viewed as a whole, then, this book offers a set 
of reflections on how this might be achieved.  As such, it represents a tentative first step 
toward fostering a long-overdue dialogue between the apostles of Augustine on the one hand, 
and the followers of Clausewitz on the other.  Whether or not it is successful—or should we 
say ‘victorious’—in this endeavour will be for others to determine.  
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